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Introduction: Global Human Rights Law and
the Boundaries of Statehood
DANIEL AUGENSTEIN* AND HANS LINDAHL**
I. THE CENTRAL THEME OF THE SPECIAL ISSUE
Whatever the true historical origins and philosophical foundations
of human rights-questions to which the contributors to this collection
of essays give different answers-their protection has taken a
distinctive form in the modern state legal order and, by extension, in the
state-centered conception of international law. Arguing from a historical
perspective, Samuel Moyn contends that, from American and French
Declarations of the "Rights of Man" to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the main purpose of human rights was to organize and
legitimize the social compact between the state and its citizens.1 If, in
the course of the eighteenth century revolutions, the "rights of man"
were proclaimed as universal principles to which positive law was
supposed to conform, these rights "only appeared through the state, and
there was no forum above it, or at times even in it, in which to indict the
state's transgression."2 Human rights retained their state-centered
focus with their appearance on the international stage after World War
II, now in the form of international declarations and covenants
established by and for independent states endowed with sovereign
equality and national collective self-determination.3  The global
expansion of human rights in this period thus reaffirmed, rather than
undermined, the central role of the state in their creation,
interpretation, and enforcement. As Marti Koskenniemi says, "[b]y
establishing and consenting to human rights limitations on their own
* Associate Professor, Tilburg Law School and Humboldt Senior Research Fellow,
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. E-mail: D.H.Augenstein@uvt.nl.
** Professor of Legal Philosophy, Tilburg University and Research Fellow,
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1. See generally SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010).
2. See id. at 26.
3. See id. at 94-98 (detailing the post-war U.N. declarations and covenants that
pertain to human rights and self-determination).
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 23 #1 (Winter 2016)
© Indiana University Maurer School of Law
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:1
sovereignty, states actually define, delimit, and contain those rights,
thereby domesticating their use and affirming the authority of the state
as the source from which such rights spring."
4
From an analytical perspective, this state-centrism of human rights
can be usefully captured by two sets of distinctions that structure their
legal operation in the international order of states: that between the
public and the private and that between the territorial and the
extraterritorial.5 As regards the former, human rights law is
traditionally seen as imposing duties on public state authorities to
respect, protect, and fulfill the rights of private individuals. This reflects
liberal concerns with preventing public state power from encroaching
upon the private sphere of individual freedom. Yet it also entails that
the legal protection of human rights in the relationship between private
actors is ensured only indirectly via positive state obligations. As
regards the latter distinction, an important consequence of the
compartmentalization of human rights in the international order of
states is that their legal protection is traditionally not thought to extend
to everyone and everywhere, but is rather confined to the territorial
state legal order. At least as a default rule, each state has a singular
legal obligation and entitlement (to the exclusion of other states) to
respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of individuals located in its
own territory.
One of the virtues of the recent "business and human rights"
debate-reflected most prominently in the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) endorsed by the
U.N. Human Rights Council in June 2011-is that the debate has
documented in considerable detail the significant impacts of global
business operations on the protection of human rights in the
international legal order of states.6 As John Ruggie, former Special
Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on Business and Human
Rights and author of the UNGP, notes,
[t]he root cause of the business and human rights
predicament today lies in the governance gaps created
by globalization - between the scope and impact of
economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies
to manage their adverse consequences. These
4. Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 397, 406 (1991).
5. For a useful introduction, see generally OLIVIER DE SCHUITER, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, COMMENTARY (2010).
6. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy"
Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNGPs].
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governance gaps provide the permissive environment for
wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without
adequate sanctioning or reparation. How to narrow and
ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human rights is
our fundamental challenge.
7
On the one hand, global business operations erode the legal and
political authority that states wield over their territory, thus
diminishing their ability to protect human rights within their own
borders. On the other hand, global business operations amplify the
human rights impacts of states' business-related laws and policies on
individuals in other states, and enhance states' opportunities to use
their "corporate nationals" to pursue foreign policy objectives.8 From
both perspectives, the exposure of the international order of public and
territorial states to the human rights impacts of private and global
business operations threatens to undermine the normativity of
international human rights law. At the same time, international law's
state-centered heritage poses significant conceptual and practical
challenges to legal reform, not least because the very distinctions
between public and private, and between territorial and extraterritorial,
are deeply embedded in the modern conception of statehood. In the
context of the distinction between public and private, this is reflected in,
for example, debates as to whether international law does or should
directly impose human rights obligations on private corporations and
thus treat them on par with public states. In the context of the
distinction between the territorial and extraterritorial, a common
concern with extraterritorial human rights protection is that it may
unduly interfere with the sovereign rights that other states wield over
their territory and the people therein. It is against this background that
the contributions to this Special Issue examine how human rights
responses to violations committed in the course of global business
operations transform the boundaries of statehood constitutive of the
state-centered conception of international human rights law. A guiding
concern is to recover the public (and political) nature of human rights
law under conditions of globalization.
7. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A
Framework for Business and Human Rights, 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).
8. These challenges are further elaborated in Daniel Augenstein, The Crisis of
International Human Rights Law in the Global Market Economy, in 44 NETHERLANDS
YEARBOOK INTERNATIONAL LAW 2013 41, 43 (Mielle K. Bulterman & Willem J.M. van
Genugten eds., 2014) ("[T]he exposure of the international legal order of states to the
operations of global business entities leads to a collusion of sovereign state interest and
globalised corporate power to the detriment of victims of human rights violations in the
global market economy.").
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II. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE
A. The Boundaries of Human Rights Law
Hans Kelsen reminds us that human rights law-like all forms of
law-must answer four fundamental questions of legal ordering: who
ought to do what, where, and when. The spatial and temporal
boundaries of legal ordering entail that human rights law is valid only
"in some space or another and for some time or another-in other words,
that it refers to events that take place somewhere and at some time."9
In addition, we must specify the material boundaries of human rights
law (the subject matter of its protection) and its personal boundaries
that circumscribe the beneficiaries of such protection.
If the spatial, temporal, and subjective (material and personal)
boundaries of human rights have traditionally been demarcated by the
state legal order, globalization is often associated with a transformation
of the space-time of modern social relations:
most contemporary social theorists endorse the view
that globalization refers to fundamental changes in the
spatial and temporal contours of social existence,
according to which the significance of space or territory
undergoes shifts in the face of a no less dramatic
acceleration in the temporal structure of crucial forms of
human activity. 10
Against this background, the first three contributions to this Special
Issue by Upendra Baxi, Fleur Johns, and Larry CatA-Backer examine
the changing boundaries of human rights law under conditions of
globalization.
Drawing attention to international law's past and present colonial
pathways, Upendra Baxi discusses how the spatial demarcation of
human rights in the international ("Westphalian") order of states
contributes to the global production of "geographies of injustice."'1 His
analysis focuses on two aspects of the statist framing of contemporary
conditions of "human rightlessness": private international law (PIL) as
an extrapolation of "colonial capitalism" that remains partisan to the
9. HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 12 (Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1934).
10. William Scheuerman, Globalization, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (June 10, 2014),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum20l4lentries/globalization.
11. Upendra Baxi, Some Newly Emergent Geographies of Injustice: Boundaries and
Borders in International Law, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 15, 25-26 (2016).
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interests of the Western "family of nations" and its multinational
corporations; and "Third Worldism" as a state of consciousness and a
form of social organization that remains derivative of, and therefore
perpetuates, international law's colonial heritage. Baxi is overall
skeptical about the prospects of liberating PIL from its statist doctrinal
corset ("competence, comity, convenience"), however little the latter may
correspond to the real places of the production and endurance of human
rightlessness in a "global risk society." Against the derivative or
"mimetic" understanding of Third Worldism, he emphasizes the
"original" counterhegemonic nature of its ideology that is increasingly
(re-)claimed by impoverished peoples in the global South and North
alike to challenge imperialist and neocolonial readings of development,
global governance, and human rights.
Fleur Johns examines the future of human rights in the changing
relationship between the temporal authority of the state and the
rhythms of global finance capital.12 The temporality of human rights is
both parasitic on, and irreducible to, the composite times of states and
markets. On the one hand, Johns sees human rights submerged into the
temporal authorities of both. On the other hand, "[p]aradoxically, this
fitful temporality of international human rights law may be less about
confirming rightful time . . . than a matter of insistently evoking the
'disjuncture of the unjust' through repeated alignments with, and
disarticulations from, other temporal registers."13 State-based law, both
national and international, structures the temporality of human rights
in the longue durde, as expressed in narratives of progress and
development (from rights-infringing pasts to rights-respecting futures)
or, more mundanely, in the "everyday" routine of office hours, meeting
schedules, and periodical reviews of states' human rights performance
by U.N. treaty bodies. If international human rights law occasionally
allows for temporal dislocations (permitting derogations in a "state of
emergency" or providing for measures to be taken "immediately" or
"promptly"), late capitalism with its just-in-time preoccupations entails
a more profound demise of the long-term that catapults human rights
into the "real time" of events and happenings. It may thus appear that
what rights-bearing subjects today hold in common is less a
commitment to any singular measure of value over time than a shared
sense of ad hoc temporal coincidence avant la crise. In what sense,
Johns asks, "might a young, unskilled, unemployed person in the United
States, a subsistence rice farmer in Laos, and an asylum seeker eking
12. Fleur Johns, The Temporal Rivalries of Human Rights, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 39, 40 (2016).
13. Id. at 41 (quoting JACQUES DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX: THE STATE OF THE DEBT,
THE WORK OF MOURNING, AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 22 (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1994)).
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out the days of a hunger strike in detention in Australia be understood
to occupy the same time scale?"14 Under these conditions, recovering the
public and political nature of human rights becomes a matter of
reactivating the times and rhythms of nationhood and the global
economy as political questions of first order.
In his contribution, Larry Catd Backer focuses on the fate of the
individual in human rights "governance regimes" within and beyond the
state.15 His analysis centers on the problem of representation in the
context of the global business and human rights debate. Who is being
represented by claims to protect human rights raised in business and
human rights fora (the individual as the object of representation)? Who
can legitimately claim to speak on behalf of the individual as the subject
of representation? Catd Backer describes a transformation of the
organization of state power after the 1950s, in the course of which the
individual rights-bearer became dissolved into a mass population
represented as an aggregation of its group characteristics. In the
"fractured territories" of global human rights governance, the individual
is appropriated by the three "Estates General" reigning over the
implementation of the UNGPs: states, business, and civil society
organizations. Dwelling on the annual United Nations Forum on
Business and Human Rights, he critiques the partial and self-serving
nature of the representational claims raised by these estates for
inhibiting the effective participation of individuals in a global assembly
constituted for their protection. Moving back to the "abstracted terrain"
of the state as the recipient of international norms, Cati Backer notes
that the more intensely "the global structures of law focus on the state,
the more profoundly the state disintegrates as a unitary site for law
grounded in popular representation."16 The extraterritorial application
of domestic law, the transplantation of national standards of corporate
responsibility through global supply chains, and the projection of global
regulatory power administered by international civil society
organizations onto the state legal order all contribute to a partition of
state territory into distinct governance regimes whose representational
logic operates beyond the reach of the state polity. Taken together, the
fractured territories and abstracted terrains of human rights
governance regimes suggest a transformation of the individual as the
represented subject of human rights within and beyond the state.
14. Id. at 56.
15. Larry CatA Backer, Fractured Territories and Abstracted Terrains: Human Rights
Governance Regimes Within and Beyond the State, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 61, 64
(2016).
16. Id. at 84 (omission of emphasis found in original).
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B. Human Rights between Public and Private Power and Authority
The contributions by Claire Cutler, Sheldon Leader, and David
Bilchitz examine the ramifications of the changing parameters of the
distinction between public and private for the transformation of
statehood under conditions of globalization. As Leader notes, the
shifting boundaries of statehood transform the rationality and
legitimacy of the state by widening or shrinking the scope of its own
powers and "var[ying] the division of labor between itself and bodies
lying outside of it."'
17
Along these lines, Claire Cutler looks at the transformation of the
nature and operation of public and private authority in the context of
the investor-state regime.18 Whereas, in the past, foreign investors had
to rely on their home states to represent heir interests in relation to the
state hosting the investment, international investment treaties now
endow them with legal rights to directly sue the host state in binding
international arbitration. This denationalizes and delocalizes control
over private foreign investment and also curtails host states' capacity to
assert public authority over their own domestic policy space, including
for the protection of human rights. Moreover, it suggests a
transformation of international law from regulating matters of public
concern between states to protecting the autonomy of private actors in
conducting their global commercial affairs. At the same time, the very
distinction between public international law, as associated with politics,
and private international law, as associated with markets, works to
depoliticize the entire realm of international commercial activity by
obstructing an understanding of the public and political dimension of
private economic activity. By way of response, Cutler examines how
human rights have been relied upon to contest the operations of the
investor-state regime, both in cases where host states have raised
human rights defenses against breach of contract claims brought by
investors and in cases where civil society organizations have attempted
to intervene in arbitration proceedings as amici curiae. The evidence of
success is rather meager, which may suggest that international
arbitration does not provide an adequate forum to deal with matters of
common public concern. Instead, host states' attempts to regain public
authority and protect human rights in relation to foreign investors may
be better served in international human rights courts.
17. Sheldon Leader, Statehood, Power, and the New Face of Consent, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 127, 127-28 (2016).
18. A. Claire Cutler, Transformations in Statehood, the Investor-State Regime, and the
New Constitutionalism, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 95, 95-96 (2016).
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For Sheldon Leader, the transformation of statehood under
conditions of globalization forces us to move beyond mere comparisons
of public and private power, and instead toward new methods to
legitimize power per se-be they found in the state or in civil society.19
Drawing on the social contract tradition, he grounds the rationale and
legitimacy of power in the "fundamental value" of consent. The shifting
boundaries of statehood are illustrated with the help of two different
conceptions of consent: a restricted conception in which the protection of
certain fundamental interests, including human rights, is a precondition
for individuals to leave the state of nature and submit to the social
order; and an extended conception that binds individuals to institutions
in a purely instrumental way, which fails to ensure a baseline of
protection against abuses of power by these very institutions. It is this
latter conception of consent, legitimating renunciation of basic rights,
that has begun to hold sway over the private and public domains of the
social order. Drawing on examples from domestic labor law, Leader
shows how individuals are induced to "gamble" with fundamental parts
of their future by embracing a radically larger field of risk than
contemplated under the restricted-consent conception, such as when
they agree to give up their right not to be unfairly dismissed in
exchange for shares in the company. At the international level, states
themselves renounce with increasing frequency baseline protections of
individual interests, be it by disenfranchising parts of their territory as
international trading zones in which employment rights do not apply, or
by contractually binding themselves to provide stable long-term
conditions for foreign investors to the detriment of protecting the
human rights of their own population.20 If these examples suggest a
trend towards relinquishing the principle that there are certain things
individuals, and states on their behalf, cannot consent to, Leader
concludes with a plea for reinstating a conception of restricted consent
that vouches for the protection of human rights against abuses of power
in the public as well as in the private domain.
David Bilchitz takes the global shift from public to private power as
a starting point for arguing that multinational corporations (should)
incur direct human rights obligations under public international law.
21
Like Leader, Bilchitz draws on the social contract tradition to show that
human rights protect fundamental interests of individuals whose
19. See Leader, supra note 17, at 127-28.
20. The latter mode of renunciation is discussed in more detail in Cutler, supra note
18, at 95, 96-99.
21. David Bilchitz, Corporations and the Limits of State-Based Models for Protecting
Fundamental Rights in International Law, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 143, 144-45
(2016).
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recognition by the state is part of their reason for accepting state
authority in the first place. Human rights are "pre-existing" moral
rights to which states seek to give effect in national-constitutional and
international law. This allows him to put the individual as bearer of
human rights entitlements (rather than the assignment of human
rights duties to institutions) at center stage, challenging the notion that
the state should be seen as the "originator" of human rights obligations,
including those of non-state actors. Bilchitz offers a number of reasons
why, under conditions of globalization, the protection of fundamental
individual interests is badly served by confining human rights
obligations to the international order of states. He considers and rejects
two attempts to shift the boundaries between public and private to
enhance state accountability for human rights violations committed by
multinational corporations: an "indirect duty model" that imposes
positive obligations on public authorities to protect the human rights of
individuals against private corporate power; and an "expanded state
model" that treats private corporations exercising public functions as
part of the state for the purpose of allocating human rights obligations.
Rather, Bilchitz contends that corporations themselves should be seen
as "partially public" entities created not only as vehicles for private
entrepreneurship and individual wealth maximization but also as
agents of society endowed with responsibilities to the public good. This,
finally, justifies treating multinational corporations as direct bearers of
international human rights obligations, commensurate with their role
as public agents of society.
C. The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights feature
in many contributions to this Special Issue, but they receive most
detailed attention in the essays by Radu Mares and Hans Lindahl. The
UNGPs puts forward a "protect, respect, and remedy" framework of
complementary and interlocking human rights duties and
responsibilities of states and corporations structured around three
pillars: the state duty to protect human rights against infringements by
corporations through appropriate policies, regulation, adjudication, and
enforcement measures; the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights, meaning to act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the
rights of others; and greater access by victims to effective remedies, both
judicial and non-judicial, for corporate-related human rights
violations.22 Following the endorsement of the UNGPs by the U.N.
22. UNGPs, supra note 6.
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Human Rights Council in 2011, a U.N. working group was established
to further promote their effective and comprehensive dissemination and
implementation. 
23
Radu Mares conceives of the UNGPs as part of a broader agenda to
develop a new transnational and "multichannel" regulatory approach to
business and human rights that moves beyond the old dichotomy
between territorial human rights government (associated with
international human rights law) and global human rights governance
(associated with corporate social responsibility).24  Here, the
transformation of the boundaries of statehood is not linked to an
imposition of public human rights obligations on corporations in
international law.25 Rather, it proceeds through a decentering of human
rights from the international order of states that ensures the mutually
supportive role of different "state-state" and "infra-firm" channels in
protecting human rights across national-territorial borders. As Mares
sees it, the UNPGs aims at "mobilizing new sources of public and
private authority [to create] a new regulatory dynamic that augments
the traditional state-centered and territory-based protection of human
rights with the leverage brought by international economic
interdependencies and multinational enterprises."26 Two elements are
crucial for the success of this global regulatory agenda: first, a "root-
cause orientation" that, in addition to redressing corporate human
rights "abuses" through domestic tort and criminal law, ensures the
global responsibility of core companies in (Western) home states for
their own conduct that produces effects throughout the global value
chain, as well as for the conduct of their affiliates (whether subsidiaries
or contractors) in the host states of corporate investment; second, a
proper alignment of these "infra-firm channels" to ensure corporate
respect for human rights with the more traditional but suitably
adjusted "state-state channels" (international trade and investment law,
international human rights law, and development aid). The ensuing
"polycentric" governance approach, Mares notes, poses a challenge to
the hegemonic role of the state in international law as much as it
presents new opportunities for law to reassert itself in the global
protection of human rights.
23. Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises, 17th Sess., May 30, 2015-June 17, 2011, U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 53, A/17/4, 6(a) (June 16, 2011). For a discussion of the proceedings of the
U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, see Backer, supra note 15, at 74-75.
24. Radu Mares, Decentering Human Rights from the International Order of States:
The Alignment and Interaction of Transnational Policy Channels, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 171, 171 (2016).
25. As suggested by Bilchitz, supra note 21 at 143-170.
26. Mares, supra note 24 at 174.
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE BOUNDARIES OF STATEHOOD 11
In the latter vein, Hans Lindahl takes issue with the UNGPs'
distinction between the state duty to protect human rights derived from
international law (the first pillar) and the legally non-binding corporate
responsibility to respect human rights rooted in a global "social license
to operate" (the second pillar).27 While Lindahl, like Mares, is critical of
confining public legal human rights obligations to states, his critique is
directed against the state-based distinction between law and non-law on
which this confinement is premised. He notes that the UNGPs'
separation of the second pillar from the first, and, within the second
pillar, the separation of corporations' duties to comply with domestic
law from their global social responsibilities, entrenches the very state-
centric approach to human rights they aim to overcome. Lindahl views
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights as an expression of
legal ordering in the form of authoritative collective action. One problem
with grounding corporate respect for human rights in a global social
license to operate is that such license must be granted by a bounded
social group as a plural political subject. To say that corporations are
"authorized" to act as specialized organs of society is to view business
operations "as part and parcel of what we, the social group, are doing
together with a view to realizing the normative point of our joint
action."2 8  Whether for the purposes of "public" human rights
government or "private" human rights governance, this authorization is
a public and political act through which a legal collective rules itself.
This enables Lindahl to show that multinational corporations are legal
orders in their own right, irreducible to the state legal orders in and
across which they operate. Moreover, it explains how corporations, as
legal subjects on par with states, can incur obligations to comply with
international human rights law.
D. Human Rights and Global Public Goods
Lindahl's analysis suggests that one of the challenges to business
and human rights is that whereas both "public" human rights
government and "private" human rights governance are conditioned by
"a determinate common or public good," it is precisely this notion of
27. Hans Lindahl, One Pillar: Legal Authority and a Social License to Operate in a
Global Context, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 201, 202-203 (2016). See also UNGPs,
supra note 6, at 13 ('The [corporate] responsibility to respect human rights is a global
standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate. It exists
independently of States' abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights
obligations, and does not diminish those obligations. And it exists over and above
compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights.").
28. Lindahl, supra note 27, at 218.
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common publicness that comes under pressure as global ordering is
increasingly left to private actors and market forces favoring particular
interests.29 The final two contributions take up this challenge by
examining the relationship between public goods and human rights in
addressing matters of common global concern.
Daniel Augenstein disentangles the notions of public goods and
human rights to "shed some critical light on their respective potential to
attend to contemporary problems of globalization."30 If economic
decisions concerning public goods are but an expression of the public
good (as the good that all members of a political community hold in
common), the internal relationship between democratic self-legislation
and human rights explains why the latter play a constitutive role in its
political definition. The different ways in which public goods and human
rights relate to the public good, traditionally vested in the nation-state,
translate into distinctive challenges to their capacity to address matters
of common global concern. On the one hand, the globalization of public
goods is marked by their functional differentiation geared towards the
realization of particular interests that will often act at cross-purposes
with each other. On the other hand, the confinement of the internal
relationship between human rights and democratic self-legislation to
the territorial state legal order fails to account for the global human
rights impacts of state-based decisions concerning public goods.
According to Augenstein, the functional differentiation of global public
goods and the territorial compartmentalization of universal human
rights illustrate an important shortcoming of appeals to global justice
that posit interests and values "we all" hold in common: they tend to
conceal or evade political conflicts about their proper interpretation and
implementation. The public-goods approach has responded to this
problem by extending the scope of political jurisdiction over public goods
to encompass all those "affected" by their costs and benefits. In the
context of human rights, this finds a counterpart in attempts to account
legally for the global human rights impacts of public goods through
extending human rights jurisdiction beyond state territory. While both
approaches come with problems of their own, taken together they may
be indicative of a "horizontal" transformation of statehood under
conditions of globalization that aims at recovering the public good
beyond the international order of states.
Neil Walker's contribution begins where Augenstein's leaves off,
asking whether the combination of public goods and human rights may,
beyond mere complementarity, provide a "general answer to the
29. See id. at 220-21.
30. Daniel Augenstein, To Whom it May Concern: International Human Rights Law
and Global Public Goods, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 225, 226 (2016).
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challenge of how to work out and operationalize [a] global ethics of
collective responsibility."31 Both concepts operate in a presumptively
universal register, which makes them prime candidates for any broader
project of global justice. Moreover, when combined, the focus of public
goods on collective provision and the focus of human rights on
individual well-being bring to the fore a core concern of modern political
morality: the relationship between social obligations and individual
freedom. Walker sets out by considering three approaches to global
justice, associated with three different (but not mutually exclusive)
models of global connectedness: a "concurrent interest" model that sees
global interdependencies as providing purely instrumental reasons for
collective action; a "mutual responsibility" model that emphasizes the
historical causes of, and associated responsibilities for, the uneven
distribution of wealth and well-being across the globe; and a "common
concern" model that envisages a deeper set of mutual commitments and
obligations grounded in our shared humanity. If the public-goods
approach most closely resembles the first model, this suggests the
modesty of its ambitions at the level of global political morality. Yet it is
precisely this modesty that makes most apparent the lacuna of global
political authority that could draw on a sufficiently developed
transnational public and political engagement to give rise to a more
embedded sense of global connectedness. If the human-rights approach,
in turn, most closely resembles the third model, its view of political
authority remains largely predicated on the nation-state, which inhibits
its broader ambitions at the level of global political morality. This,
Walker adds, also applies with regard to the extraterritorial application
of human rights obligations discussed by Augenstein, insofar as these
remain "an external source of instruction and exhortation to states to
modify their actions, rather than a signal of the emergence of regional
or global political communities with their own state-independent
authoritative foundations."32 In the end, both approaches confront us
with the frustrating phenomenon of "one hand clapping": the public-
goods approach suffers from a deficit of global political authority, which
reinforces its incompleteness at the level of political morality; the
human-rights approach, in turn, remains predicated on state-centered
structures of political authority, which translates into an unduly
abstract discourse of universal moral entitlement that fails to spell out a
conception of the public good sufficiently sensitive to justice at the global
level.
31. Neil Walker, Human Rights and Global Public Goods: The Sound of One Hand
Clapping?, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 249, 250 (2016) (emphasis in original).
32. Id. at 262 (emphasis in original).
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